Os direitos humanos no Direito dos Povos: seu conteúdo, funções, participação em uma teoria de paz e possível fundamentação

Abstract

The list of human rights present in The Law of Peoples differs from that list usually found in many democratic constitutions and it suffers accusations of not being properly justified. The fact of bringing a list of human rights with liberal roots to where certain guarantees are absent might make one theory of peace based on the Law of Peoples especially efficient, because it leaves open the possibility that non-liberal, but decent, peoples integrate the Society of Peoples, reducing the mistrust as well the resentment. Furthermore, this list of human rights is properly justified. However, in order to understand such justification is necessary to have a certain knowledge of the ideal of Justice as Fairness, especially of some of its features and assumptions such as the original position in a veil of ignorance, the use of the public reason and the reasonable pluralism, because the Law of Peoples does a diverse and analogous use of these features and assumptions. The Law of Peoples conceives peoples as free and equals and sets forth which principles ideal representatives of peoples, under a veil of ignorance, would choose in order to regulate the relations between peoples. It is an extension of a liberal theory of justice towards the international level. As such, the inclusion of non-liberal, but decent, peoples in a Society of Peoples is necessary, because it is an exigency innate of political liberalism. The foundation of a list of human rights not entirely comprehensive, have its origin justly in this necessity of tolerance towards non-liberal peoples. No doubt a list containing more rights would be desirable, but this would bring justification problems, eventually it would be seen as an imposition of liberal values in the international extent.