Nietzsche e a tarefa da grande política: sobre a interpretação perfeccionista de seu radicalismo aristocrático.

Abstract

This dissertation seeks proposals for the definition of great politics, in the work of Nietzsche, considering it as a “program” associated with his critique of morality, addressed to modernity. Especially elusive, the content of the concept is difficult to be defined, so that two keys to the reading are privileged, by the duration of the interval separating them, allowing to collate complementarities and distinctions: recent perfectionist interpretation and the critically enshrined attribution – contemporary to the philosopher – of an “aristocratic radicalism”. Thus, as an integral part of that reconstitution, the bibliographical survey aims the balance of the reception of this item of Nietzsche’s political thought by privileging three authors: Ciano Aydin (2007), Daniel W. Conway (1997), and Paul J.M. van Tongeren (2008). So, it is covered, according to Aydin, the Nietzschean will to power as the possibility for a framework of necessary conditions to a politics free from reduction to a mere branch of technics. Moreover, he argues that the concept offers alternatives to escape the setback to perspectives that involve some kind of absolute or pre-existing social order, through basic guidelines in derivation of two “constituents” of the reality, in his “organization-struggle” model. Therefore, his propositions are discussed, based on similarities and differences between this one towards the Carl Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction and the Claude Lefort’s indeterminate character of democracy, as well as the terms of the movement for perfection of a healthy culture in declared opposition to the stasis of its identity, embracing the multiplicity, the variability, and the relationality. In turn, with Conway, it is discussed the role of politics in the humankind enhancement, understood in the breeding of rare individuals, representatives of the more exalted potentialities by the construction of great human beings. Accordingly, it is analyzed if, in Nietzsche, this subject emerges like a case of ultimate justification, legitimation, or affirmation, and if there is, in the form of a galvanization of the will, a promise of future that could renew the goals of this superlative ventures, responsible for setting up new horizons, provided by the philosophical law. In this way, the functions and registers of the figures of the legislator, the indeterminate animal – excluding the overman (Übermensch) – were evaluated by Conway’s reading of the perfectionism – indebted to Stanley Cavell –, a term that carries the disadvantage of possibly generate the misunderstanding of a stage of the species completion, idealism rejected by the philosopher on behalf of the plasticity of human indeterminacy. Finally, it is considered the statement of van Tongeren, which establishes, in the scenario of the contemporary debate, on the one hand, the criticism of perfectionist interpretations and, on the other, if the German philosopher would be a “supra-political thinker” (“über-politischer Denker”), via the problem of naturalistic inspiration about the “undetermined animal” and its differentia specifica.