Equilíbrio Reflexivo Amplo e Justificação Pessoal.

Abstract

Ever since its nominal formulation by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971), and later popularization by a series of papers published by Norman Daniels (1979-1983), the method of wide reflective equilibrium has remained as an important part of the epistemological and metaethical debates. In spite of this role, since then the understanding of the method has not progressed substantially beyond Daniels’ papers. The aim of this dissertation is to fill this gap by arguing that Rawls's philosophy has presuppositions from which it is possible to articulate an alternative version of the method. Contrary to the standard reading put forward by Daniels, it is defended that the wide reflective equilibrium is laid out to inform that justice as fairness is the answer to the following question: if a reasonable person were personally justified in believing her moral beliefs, what conception of justice she would believe upon reflection? The wide reflective equilibrium is presented as the outline for a model of personal justification that is moderately foundationalist. Based on this image of the method are examined some objections traditionally addressed against it, such as the objections of descriptivism and conservatism. It is concluded that those objections correctly indicates some of its limitations, although it is uncertain whether such limitations are genuine flaws in Rawls’s method or not.