Sobre a confiabilidade das intuições para sustentar premissas de argumentos filosóficos.

Abstract

Intuitions play a peculiar part in philosophical enquiry, either serving as evidence for the premises in philosophical arguments, or as judgements obtained as a result of hypothetical cases. Its probative status, however, is quite controversial. With that in mind, we intend to investigate whether intuitions are a reliable tool for philosophical enquiry. Some questions must be addressed in order to understand the probative status of intuitions. Contemporary philosophers seek to investigate the role of intuitions in establishing philosophy’s autonomous and authoritative quality. Intuitions may be understood as a priori, which places them in an autonomous and authoritative relation to science. They may also be understood as posteriori, which places them in a relation of continuity with the sciences. Some authors that support an a priori perspective, on one hand, understand the ontology of the intuitions as the possession of concepts of classification. On the other hand, authors that support a posteriori perspective understand this ontology as natural types. The characterization of intuitions either as possession of a concept or as natural types, results in the support of positive or negative perspectives of the use of intuitions. We will argue here that intuitions are basic sources of knowledge which are classified accordingly when the agent possesses the determining concept. In this sense, we will propose through a reading (of Alvin Goldman) that the reliability of the intuitions is found through second order investigations.