O conceito de objetividade: um estudo sobre sua estrutura lógica e definição mínima.

Abstract

This study started from the following question: what is objectivity? In order to answer it, a comprehensive analysis of the concept of objectivity was articulated, focusing especially on the logical structure and the possibility of a minimal definition of that concept. By logical structure was understood a set of basic concepts more immediately linked to that of objectivity and that constitutes the background of its intelligibility. By minimal definition it was understood the most elementary formal definition that is necessary for something to be counted as objective. It was assumed that both types of analysis are fundamental to understanding the concept at stake. In this sense, it was understood that the role of structural analysis is to elucidate what is the conceptual background that ensures the intelligibility of the concept. For this, the following structural concepts were chosen and analyzed, namely: object, existence, reality, subject, perception and mind. Central to this structural analysis was the problem of the relationship between subject and object/subjectivity and objectivity. It showed necessary to provide an adequate characterization of each of the poles of the relationship so that it could then be provide an adequate characterization of the relationship itself. Then, having specified each pole of the relationship, it was understood that this it is an intrinsically dialectical relationship, which does not present a prospect of philosophical resolution. It was concluded that this result does not need to be negatively evaluated, but rather that it reveals profound and interesting facts about human nature. A more specific practical conclusion was also drawn from this, namely: that objectivity in areas such as ethics, aesthetics, politics, etc. it will always demand a correct understanding of the dialectical nature of this concept, which is why, in such cases, the whole role of subjectivity cannot be neglected. Once the conceptual background of objectivity was set out, it was maintained that it is possible to articulate a minimal conception of objectivity. Such a concept is certainly unable to resolve substantive issues, but is previously necessary for anything like this. That is, before taking sides in substantive debates about objectivity, it is necessary to be clear about what is being talked about, that is, about what can be minimally seen as objectivity. As for the definitional proposal in particular, a minimalist conception centered on the non-arbitrariness of judgments was used. More precisely: it was held that, in a minimal sense, the concept of objectivity expresses primarily a property that certain epistemological items have (e.g., judgments, beliefs, etc.) when, in a given context of cognitive interest, they follow normative standards whose authority is legitimate – where a legitimate authority is one that is not exclusively constituted by personal attitudes. This minimalist conception tries to account for the elementary demands of the main objectivist theories of the western tradition; and it is distinguished by recognizing the need to outline a field of cognitive interest. This avoids, thus, the problem of triviality, that is: the suspicion that, since any significant statement can be equivalent to an objective statement, objectivity may not add anything to our discourse. Actually, this problem can undermine the very distinction between objectivity and subjectivity. However, by being articulated in primarily epistemological terms, including the consideration of epistemic interests and capabilities, the minimal conception articulated here avoids triviality. And even though it is primarily epistemic, it proves to be compatible with the most common metaphysical conceptions about the ultimate nature of objectivity.