A estrutura do juízo moral em Aristóteles.

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present the possibility of moral judgment interpretation in terms of Aristotelian notions of deliberation and decision. It gives the opportunity to find an alternative before the dichotomy between judgments of fact and value judgments. While this dichotomy is accepted, moral judgment is seen as something arbitrary, it does not have an objective base, but only subjective, as it is understood as the result of an intuition, or as the expression of emotions. By understanding the moral judgment as deliberation and choice, we are able to provide objectivity to judgments, since beliefs, desires and factual considerations can be considered in this reflective procedure. Thus, to support such interpretation, I analyze the virtue ethics developed specially in the Anglo-American analytic philosophy, since it is in this context that theoretical moral judgment becomes understood as a deliberative procedure. Thereafter, I present an analysis, based in Aristotelian philosophy, about the notions of deliberation and decision and about the design of practical wisdom in order to understand the role of these notions.